Accountability and Deterrence
Recent global political events have me thinking about the traditional theory of deterrence and its relationship to accountability. In both cases the idea is to reduce or eliminate an undesirable outcome by threatening consequences.
The introduction of new technologies inevitably leads to situations where privileged economic positions are created. This situation may be acceptable if the technology is sufficiently compelling. Xerox enjoyed a complete monopoly on the manufacture and sale of plain paper photocopiers for many years. Polaroid achieved a similar position in the market for instant photography.
This situation has not in general been acceptable in the case of network protocols. Xerox did not attempt to achieve a monopoly in the sale of Ethernet technology. Regardless of any technical benefits it is unlikely that Ethernet could have supplanted IBM's token ring if it had been a proprietary technology.
'Open standards' has been the mantra in network protocol design for several decades. What is less often considered is the extent to which open standards rely on open standards institutions and the control that these might exercise over a standard.
For profit corporations have very clear lines of accountability to their shareholders and to their customers. Patents only protect a market for a temporary period and the strongest possible patent on the manufacture of buggy whips is rendered obsolete by the internal combustion engine.
Developing strong accountability mechanisms within a non-profit organization is a significant challenge but the very purpose of constructing the institution is to address control points that are considered too sensitive to be allowed as private property.
The level of suspicion that surrounds such institutions is frequently high. A risk clearly exists yet that risk is rarely realized. Why?
Accountability suggests a control regime in which the range of control feedback is continuous. If an accountable party defects to a small degree they face minor consequences, if they defect to a larger degree the consequences increase accordingly.
Not-for-profit open standards institutions appear to operate in a different regime in which the control feedback is non-linear. The lack of direct accountability means that minor defections do not in general attract consequences. If a major defection occurs the consequences are likely to be very serious and there is a very high probability that the institution will not survive in its current form with its former authority intact.
The term 'deterrence' seems to be appropriate for this non-linear form of all-or-nothing consequences. As in the cold war there is considerable ambiguity as to the actions that might be considered a defection and the reaction that might result. Such ambiguity is destabilizing and may lead to minor issues leading to catastrophic consequences.
